The abstention doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in 1941 in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. calls for federal courts to postpone asserting jurisdiction over federal constitutional challenges to state laws to permit state courts to resolve potentially dispositive ambiguities in those laws. In preemption cases, however, many courts have declined to abstain under Pullman, despite the fact that preemption challenges to state laws raise the very federalism-based concerns that the Pullman doctrine was designed to address. When a state law is challenged on grounds that it is preempted by a federal law, ambiguous and potentially dispositive matters of state law often remain undecided. A federal court's refusal to abstain in such cases risks the possibility of needless interference with state programs, unseemly conflict with state courts, or superfluous or premature adjudication of federal issues. This Note argues that federal courts should invoke Pullman abstention in preemption cases using a flexible, case-by-case analysis that preserves the ability of federal courts to vindicate federal rights without jeopardizing core principles of judicial federalism or wasting scarce resources.
Introduction
Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's recent "New Federalism" jurisprudence, which has threatened to curtail the unlimited legislative power enjoyed by Congress in the post-New Deal era, concurrent regulation of broad swaths of the economy by both federal and state governments is certain to remain a permanent feature of our political order.1 Heightened regulatory activity at both levels of government in 
. has placed limits on
Congress's authority to regulate commerce, abrogate states' sovereign immunity, craft remedies for constitutional violations, and 'commandeer' state officials."). The Court's New Federalism revival establishes an "outer limit" to Congress's power, rather than sharply restricting or repealing any powers Congress enjoyed in the post-New Deal era. See Allison H. Eid, Teaching New Federalism, St. Louis U. L.J. 875, 877-78 ("Clearly, the Lopez majority was searching for a way to put some teeth back into the Commerce Clause. . . . But it seemed far more reluctant to cast doubt on [post-New Deal] precedent."); see also Comstock v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1949 Ct. , 1956 Ct. (2010 (upholding a federal statute requiring civil detention for sexually dangerous federal prisoners as a legitimate exercise of Congress's far-reaching power under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause); Gonza-turn makes it increasingly likely that federal and state laws will conflict.2 As a general matter, when there is a conflict between a state law and a federal law, the federal law "preempts" the state law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 3 Litigants seeking to reduce their regulatory burdens frequently try to use federal preemption of state law to their advantage.4 Regulated parties often file suit in federal court seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against a state statute, regulation, or other action on grounds that it is preempted by a federal law.5 Although the basis for federal jurisdiction over such matters has been contested, federal courts have long been willing to entertain these actions. 6 Federal courts' exercise of original jurisdiction over preemption challenges to state laws, however, may pose a subtle threat to important principles of judicial federalism.7 When federal courts are called upon to review a recently enacted state measure to determine if it is preempted by a federal law, potentially dispositive matters of state law may remain unclear.8 A state court may never have interpreted the chal- Rev. 233, 239-40 (1991) ("Shaw seems wrong, if read to permit any federal immunity holder automatic access to federal courts for declaratory and injunctive relief.").
7 See Fleet Bank, Nat'l Ass'n. v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 892 (2d Cir. 1998) (warning that "opening the federal courts" to certain preemption claims "risks a major and unwarranted incursion on the authority of state courts to construe state statutes"); see also infra notes 212-239 and accompanying text.
8 See Fleet Bank, 160 F.3d at 889 n.5 ("In some cases properly invoking federal jurisdiction to consider preemption claims, state law must be examined by the federal court . . . to determine whether the nature of the interest regulated by state law is preempted by federal law.").
lenged law, and its precise meaning and scope might be ambiguous.9 In addition, doubts may remain as to whether the state law authorized the law. 10 Federal court resolution of such difficult matters of state law risks disturbing the delicate relationship between state and federal courts and perhaps even undermines the "reign" of law.11 Under our constitutional scheme of federalism and dual sovereignty, it is state, not federal, courts that serve as the "final expositors of state law."12 For this reason, federal courts must decide questions of state law only as they believe a state's highest court would decide them.13 Although federal judges are highly competent and usually able to accurately apply state law, in cases in which a question of state law is genuinely unclear, a federal judge can only speculate as to how a state judge would resolve the unclear state law issue.14 The potential hazards of such a guessing game are significant.15 If a federal court strikes down a state measure on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of state law, it risks invalidating a policy that the state 46 See Werhan, supra note 29, at 471 ("Especially in the context of modern public law litigation, the interpretation of state governing statutes poses subtle problems for a court. The task of intuiting how the highest state court would approach these issues is not always easy for federal judges.").
47 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Writing in dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan argued that Ex parte Young would work a radical change in our governmental system. . . . It would enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official actions of the States as if they were "dependencies" or provinces. It would place the States of the Union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when the Constitution was adopted . . . .
Id.
48 
B. Pendent Jurisdiction over State Law Claims
The Supreme Court further complicated the relationship between federal and state courts when, in Siler, it concluded that a federal court, after obtaining jurisdiction over a lawsuit, may resolve all questions of law in the case.50 Until Siler, it was unclear whether plaintiffs challenging a state measure on grounds of both federal and state law would have to file their state law claims in state court.51 Such a requirement would have detracted from the power of Ex parte Young by requiring plaintiffs with related federal and state claims to pursue litigation in two different forums or relinquish their right to a federal forum altogether.52 Siler ensured that litigants would have all of their claims, federal and state, resolved in a single action in federal court.53
At the time of its decision, Siler was also understood as an effort to moderate the potential conflict resulting from federal court review of state laws.54 The Siler Court counseled federal judges to resolve challenges to state laws on state law grounds whenever possible, rather than appeal directly to the force of the federal Constitution.55 This practice was thought to ameliorate conflict between the federal government and the states and to permit a continued dialogue with state legislatures regarding the reform of state programs and policies.56
Siler's long-term consequence, however, was to draw federal judges even further into the resolution of complicated and ambiguous questions of state law.57 Although federal courts were designed as forums for vindicating federal rights, challenges to state measures routinely required federal judges to interpret and apply state law, often without adequate guidance from state courts.58 
C. Justice Frankfurter's Response: Pullman and the Establishment of the Abstention Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decisions expanding the role of the lower federal courts in reviewing state measures were seen by many as privileging access to federal justice over adherence to long-standing constitutional principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.59 Ex parte Young and Siler were strongly criticized for diminishing the power of states and municipalities to organize their affairs free from intrusive oversight by the federal judiciary.60
In 1941, in Pullman, the Supreme Court-the members of which were now more sympathetic to such criticisms-articulated an abstention doctrine, which addressed the unique problems of judicial federalism arising from the exercise of original federal jurisdiction over challenges to state measures.61 The Pullman doctrine calls on federal courts to abstain from ruling on federal constitutional challenges to state measures when a state court's resolution of an unclear question of state law might avoid, or substantially change the consideration of, the federal question. 62 The Pullman case originated with a controversial order of the Railroad Commission of Texas mandating that sleeper cars operated on Texas railroads be staffed at all times by an individual with the rank of Pullman conductor.63 At the time the order was promulgated, it was "well known" that all Pullman conductors were white and all Pullman porters were black.64 The Commission's policy, although expressed in neutral terms, had very strong overtones of racial discrimination. 65 The Pullman Company and the railroads sought an injunction against the Commission in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas on grounds that the order violated the federal Constitution and Texas law.66 The three-judge panel sought to avoid the federal constitutional claim by grounding its decision exclusively on Texas law. 67 Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field preemption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict preemption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.91
In short, the Supremacy Clause "requires courts to ignore cant, or the possibility of superfluous adjudication is considerable, abstention may be justified in the preemption context.114
This Part analyzes the competing explanations for the Pullman doctrine.115 Section A discusses the argument that Pullman abstention is designed solely to avoid federal constitutional questions.116 Section B considers the argument that the Pullman doctrine provides a multifactored inquiry meant to harmonize federal court review of state laws with principles of judicial federalism and thus may apply even in the absence of a federal constitutional issue.117
A. The Invocation of Pullman Abstention to Avoid Federal Constitutional Questions
Pullman is often viewed as " . . . illustrative of . . . the basic constitutional doctrine that substantial constitutional issues should be adjudicated only when no alternatives are open."118 In other words, Pullman abstention can be understood as a corollary to the well-established doctrine of "constitutional avoidance," which instructs courts to interpret statutes and other enactments to avoid constitutional problems.119 The avoidance principle is typically grounded in the insight that a constitutional ruling halts the democratic process and terminates any ongoing or potential dialogue with other governmental actors.120 The judiciary's power to interpret the Constitution may permanently limit the latitude of the political branches, including state governments, and thus must be wielded only when absolutely necessary.121
According to this interpretation, the Supreme Court abstained in Pullman because a decision regarding the Railroad Commission's authority under Texas law would end the suit and avoid the need to decide whether the Commission's order violated the federal Constitu-tion.122 If that interpretation is correct, then the Court's opinion in Pullman stands for the narrow proposition that federal courts should abstain to permit plaintiffs to seek a definitive opinion from a state court on an unclear question of state law only when doing so would allow the federal court to avoid decision of a federal constitutional issue. 123 In 1949, in Propper v. Clark, the Supreme Court indicated that Pullman may not be invoked to avoid the decision of federal nonconstitutional issues, seemingly confirming a narrow view of the Pullman doctrine.124 The Court opined that "[w]here a case involves a nonconstitutional federal issue . . . the necessity for deciding which depends upon the decision on an underlying issue of state law, the practice in federal courts has been, when necessary, to decide both issues."125
Propper involved a federal statute, the applicability of which turned on the interpretation of state law.126 New York state appointed a receiver to liquidate and distribute the assets of an Austrian firm.127 After the receiver's appointment, the President of the United States issued an Executive order, applying the federal Trading with the Enemy Act to Austria.128 The Alien Property Custodian (the "Custodian"), the federal officer responsible for enforcing the federal statute, brought suit in federal court to obtain the Austrian firm's assets. 129 Ultimately, the federal Custodian's ability to seize the assets pursuant to the federal statute turned on the extent of the receiver's authority under New York law.130 Yet, because the federal issue was a purely statutory matter, the Court concluded that abstention under Pullman was inappropriate notwithstanding the ambiguous and potentially dispositive questions of New York law.131 The Court added that, although the issue of New York law was subject to varying interpretations, abstention would be an improper application of the Pullman doctrine because federal courts may depart from the "normal procedure" of deciding Moreover, an error of this kind gives rise to the possibility of an unseemly struggle between state and federal courts.145 A subsequent state court determination will likely supplant the federal decision, and efforts to implement the state measure will begin once again (assuming the unnecessary delay has not permanently damaged the state's program).146 The litigation will then return to federal court for a ruling on the federal constitutionality of the program.147 According to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Pullman, such conflict and instability is inconsistent with the "reign of law" and tentative decisions of this kind should be avoided whenever possible.148
If the federal court upholds the state measure based on an erroneous interpretation of state law, it will have superfluously ruled on the federal issue.149 An unnecessary decision may be inconsistent with the obligation of Article III courts to adjudicate only "actual cases or controversies" and, in any case, should be avoided on prudential grounds.150
Thus, it seems that Pullman's judicial federalism-based policies against "wrongful interference" with state laws and "friction" between federal and state courts can be served equally regardless of whether there is any federal constitutional issue in the case.151 For this reason, commentators have proposed eliminating the presence of a federal constitutional issue as a prerequisite for Pullman abstention.152
IV. The Federal Court Record: Conflicting Approaches to Pullman Abstention in Preemption Cases
Federal courts have disagreed on whether the Pullman doctrine may be invoked to postpone decision of federal preemption challenges to state laws.153 Though some federal appellate courts have yet to grapple with the applicability of Pullman in preemption cases, existing case law reveals three distinct perspectives.154 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, along with a majority of federal courts, has refused to abstain to avoid deciding federal preemption claims on the grounds that preemption is not a substantial constitutional issue.155 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has abstained in such cases on the grounds that federal preemption challenges to state laws raise the very judicial federalism concerns that the Pullman doctrine was designed to address.156 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has denied federal jurisdiction altogether over federal preemption challenges to state laws when the plaintiff disputes the meaning of the challenged state measure.157
A. The Third Circuit: Pullman Abstention Is Inappropriate in Suits Alleging Federal Preemption of State Law Because Preemption Is Not a Substantial Federal Constitutional Issue
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule that Pullman abstention is never warranted to postpone the decision of a federal preemption claim.158 This view rests on the premise that federal preemption claims are not the sort of sensitive constitutional questions that the Pullman doctrine was purportedly designed to avoid.159 On this reading, preemption claims call for merely 158 163 The company argued that the threatened license revocation was a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment and was also preempted by federal banking statutes. 164 The state insurance department called on the federal court to abstain under Pullman.165 According to the state insurance regulators, the state statute at issue had never been authoritatively construed by the state courts, and thus consideration of the legality of the license revocation under the federal Constitution or federal statutes was premature.166 The district court agreed and dismissed the case.167 The Third Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Max Rosenn, reversed the decision to abstain.168
The Third Circuit held that a claim that a state statute is preempted by a federal statute, although it may be partially grounded in the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, is not a substantial federal consti- Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has expressed the view that Pullman abstention may be invoked to postpone decision of federal preemption challenges to state measures.172 In 1972, in Druker v. Sullivan, the First Circuit held that the Pullman doctrine is still "applicable where . . . the federal claim is in part statutory."173 Druker remains a significant case because of its conclusion that Pullman abstention applies to at least some non-constitutional federal questions, including preemption claims.174
Druker involved a decision by the Boston Rent Board to invalidate a rent increase sought by the proprietors of Castle Square, a federally subsidized housing project.175 The owners of the property filed suit against the Rent Board in federal district court alleging, among other claims, that the Rent Board's authority to regulate federally subsidized buildings was preempted by the National Housing Act.176 The district court abstained from ruling to permit a state court to decide whether the Rent Board had authority under state law to deny the rent increase.177
The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Frank Coffin, affirmed the abstention order.178 After a prolonged analysis of the possible interpretations of state law, the court concluded that the "discussion casts more than contrived doubt on Boston's authority [under impose rent control on Castle Square."179 Accordingly, this unclear and potentially dispositive question of state law justified the district court's decision to abstain.180 Druker's broad understanding of the Pullman doctrine's scope was followed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1996 in Phillip Morris v. Harshbarger.181 In Phillip Morris, a group of cigarette manufacturers sought to enjoin the Massachusetts Attorney General from filing a lawsuit to recover expenses paid by the state's Medicaid program for patients who had illnesses caused by smoking.182 A recently-enacted state law explicitly authorized the suit.183 The plaintiffs alleged that both the state law and the threatened lawsuit violated the federal Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause and were also preempted by federal statutes, including the Medicaid Act and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.184 Although the court had jurisdiction to hear the federal claims, it abstained. 185 The court determined that, under the Pullman doctrine, "a federal court may abstain from hearing federal statutory and constitutional issues until uncertain underlying issues of state law have first been resolved by the state courts."186 The court observed that the Attorney General's lawsuit was based on a novel theory of liability, the precise contours of which had not yet been determined and which needed to be first "construed as a matter of state law."187 The court therefore decided to stay the proceedings, including both the federal preemption claim and the federal constitutional claim, pending determination by the state judiciary of the uncertain state law questions.188
C. The Second Circuit: Federal Courts Lack Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Preemption Claims When the Plaintiffs Dispute the Meaning of the Challenged State Measure
The view of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider federal preemption challenges to state laws when the plaintiffs dispute the meaning of the state measure.189 The Second Circuit established this rule in 1998, in Fleet Bank, National Ass'n v. Burke, which involved a suit by a national bank seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Connecticut's Commissioner of Banking from interfering with the bank's imposition of surcharges on automated teller (ATM) transactions. 190 The plaintiff alleged that Connecticut's banking laws-properly construed-did not prohibit the bank from imposing the ATM fees. 191 If the statutes were interpreted to prohibit the fees, however, the plaintiff alleged that the laws would then be preempted by federal banking statutes. 192 The Commissioner sought a stay of the proceedings pursuant to the Pullman doctrine.193 He argued that the state statutes in question had "never been construed by any court . . . and urged that the initial construction should be made by a state court."194 The district court refused to abstain, however, on grounds that Pullman abstention is "not appropriately invoked in a preemption case."195 Instead, the court resolved the matter entirely on the basis of state law, ruling that Connecticut's banking laws did not prohibit the bank from imposing the ATM fees. 196 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.197 Although the court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. authorized federal courts to hear challenges to state laws based exclusively on federal preemption, the court distinguished Shaw by noting that the bank was actually seeking a favorable interpretation of state law, rather than a direct ruling on a preemption claim. 198 The court expressed serious concern that accepting jurisdiction over preemption claims when the challenged state law is ambiguous would create major challenges for judicial federalism and potentially strain the relations between federal and state courts.199 Consideration of such suits by federal courts, the court reasoned, constitutes a "major and unwarranted incursion on the authority of state courts to construe state statutes."200 The court concluded that allowing a federal court to "determine . . . as a matter of state law . . . the authority of state officials to act," without any guidance from the state judiciary, is an "ill-advised use of federal question jurisdiction." 201 The court conceded that one solution to judicial federalism concerns would be for federal courts to accept jurisdiction over preemption claims and then abstain under Pullman to allow a state court to resolve unclear and potentially dispositive issues of state law.202 The court determined, however, that the "subtle issue of Pullman abstention" should be avoided.203 Moreover, the court recognized that the consensus among federal courts is that "preemption claims . . . do not present 'substantial' constitutional issues" and thus Pullman abstention is inappropriate in preemption cases. 204 Nonetheless, the court's disposition of the suit closely mirrored the procedure that courts follow in Pullman abstention cases. 205 The court dismissed the case and directed the plaintiff to obtain a declaration from a state court regarding the unclear question of Connecticut law, but also instructed the plaintiff to reserve its federal preemption claims so that it might return to federal court if the state court's ruling was not favorable. As the previous Part illustrates, federal courts continue to disagree as to the propriety of invoking Pullman abstention to postpone ruling on federal preemption challenges to state laws.207 Section A of this Part argues that Pullman abstention remains highly valuable as a mechanism for delaying jurisdiction over preemption claims until federal courts can review state laws without violating core principles of judicial federalism or damaging the critical relationship between federal and state courts.208 Although Pullman can be an unwieldy doctrine for courts to apply, and its use should certainly be limited to those cases where state law is genuinely unclear, it remains an important tool for federal courts to ensure that review of state laws does not needlessly interfere with the "harmonious functioning" of the federal system. 209 Section B of this Part illustrates how the Pullman abstention doctrine should be applied to the kinds of preemption claims that federal courts are most likely to confront.210 By proposing and analyzing hypothetical scenarios based on the fact patterns of actual cases, this Note illustrates how a federal judge can recognize the instances in which the Pullman doctrine is applicable and clarifies the concrete interests that abstention can promote.211
A. The Invocation of Pullman in Preemption Cases with Unclear and Potentially Dispositive Issues of State Law
Some think that federal courts should be reluctant to apply Pullman abstention because it is awkward, outdated, and unmanageable. 212 The Pullman doctrine has been criticized for requiring unnecessarily complex procedures, which impose enormous costs and delays on litigants. 213 It has also been heavily criticized for vesting extraordinary discretion in federal courts to ignore affirmative congressional grants of jurisdiction, purportedly violating separation of powers principles.214
Nonetheless, the Pullman doctrine remains an indispensable solution to the unavoidable dilemmas that arise when the laws of two sovereign legal systems are implicated in a single case.215 Specifically, Pullman solves a significant problem of judicial federalism that stems from the competing obligations of Article III federal courts to both protect federal rights from encroachment by state authorities as well as to decide matters of state law only as would a state's highest court.216 Because state measures often threaten to trample on federal rights, federal courts must be able to entertain preemptive challenges to state action.217 At the same time, such cases will often require decision of difficult or ambiguous questions of state law, which can only be authoritatively decided by the state judiciary. 218 This dilemma persists in preemption cases, despite the unwillingness of many federal courts to acknowledge it.219 Preemption claims require a federal court to handle difficult or unclear matters of state law, including the important question of whether the "interest regulated" by the state law falls within the scope of the allegedly controlling federal statute. 220 The federal court's determination of the state law question often is, or should be, the most controversial matter in the case.221 Thus, litigants in preemption cases, especially those charged with representing state authorities, often wonder why a federal court is involved in what appears to be purely a matter of state law. 222 The obvious response is that preemption claims implicate federal rights and that protecting federal rights is a federal court's highest priority.223 Yet, regardless of the nature of the rights at stake, it seems un-deniable that some, perhaps many, preemption cases are dominated by matters of state law.224 Litigants are thus justified in doubting that any interest is served by requiring a federal court to " [shoot] in the dark on the state law issue" in a suit between citizens of the same state.225 Such a requirement intrudes into a realm usually reserved to the state judiciary. 226 Pullman abstention provides a partial solution to this problem: when a litigant seeks a federal forum to enforce his federal rights, but the outcome of the suit turns on ambiguous matters of state law, Pullman allows the federal court to retain control of the proceedings even as the the state judiciary resolves unclear questions of state law.227 It therefore allows for state court involvement in federal question litigation when matters of state law dominate the case. 228 Thus, the Pullman doctrine promotes much needed comity between federal and state courts by considering the crucial role of state courts as the "final expositors of state law."229 Complimentarily, the doctrine confines the federal courts to their appropriately limited role as interpreters of federal law, insofar as that role is consistent with congressional grants of jurisdiction and with the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of disputes between litigants. 230 The doctrine can, and should, be used to avoid or postpone federal jurisdiction over preemption claims until review of state laws can take place without disrupting the relationship between federal and state courts, unnecessarily meddling in state programs and policies, or creating a risk of superfluous or wasteful adjudication.231
Of course, Pullman abstention is not any easier to apply in preemption cases than in other contexts.232 Federal courts will still need to confront the same difficult set of questions that the Pullman doctrine always provokes: How unclear must the state law be to warrant abstention?233 How likely must it be that an alternative, and dispositive, interpretation will be supplied by the state judiciary?234 When do the costs to the litigants outweigh the potential benefits of abstention?235 All of these questions remain in preemption cases and require application of a supple, even-handed inquiry that is capable of accurately weighing costs and benefits in particular instances.236
Even if the doctrine continues to be difficult for courts to understand and apply, its utility in promoting principles of judicial federalism, in the preemption context and elsewhere, cannot be denied.237 Pullman abstention allows federal courts to vindicate federal rights, as Congress and the public expect, without infringing on the "rightful independence of the state governments."238 The doctrine may not deserve routine application, but it does deserve serious consideration by federal courts interested in "retain [ing] . . . a manageable federalized judicial structure."239
B. A Guide to the Application of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine in Preemption Cases
Because the amorphous standards of the Pullman abstention doctrine are difficult to apply, the following hypothetical scenarios help to illustrate how and why abstention can be valuable in preemption cases.240 Each hypothetical presents a different "configuration of parties and claims" to illustrate the varying circumstances in which Pullman abstention is relevant.241
Suits Alleging That Federal Law Preempts an Ambiguous State
Statute or Regulation: "Construction Cases"242
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of industrial cleaning supplies, files suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State Attorney General from enforcing a recently-enacted state law regulating exposure to hazardous chemicals. 243 The state statute sets costly new standards requiring employers to limit workers' exposure to certain toxins and authorizes civil and criminal penalties for employers who fail to comply with the law's provisions. 244 The plaintiff alleges that the state law is preempted by a federal statute that regulates the same toxins but permits higher levels of exposure. 245 The plaintiff also seeks a declaration that the state statute, properly construed, does not apply to the chemicals used at its facilities, which the company has long believed is safe.246
If the federal court cannot, with reasonable certainty, predict how the state statute would be construed by the state's highest court, and the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff is possible, the federal court should abstain under Pullman pending a definitive ruling by the state judiciary regarding the statute's precise scope.247 Unlike the Second Circuit in Fleet Bank, National Ass'n v. Burke, which denied federal subject matter jurisdiction over a similar preemption challenge because the plaintiff disputed the meaning of the challenged state law, the court in the hypothetical scenario should instead accept jurisdiction and abstain under Pullman if the dispositive question of state law is ambiguous. 248 Pullman abstention seems like the appropriate mechanism for involving the state courts in this case; denying jurisdiction entirely, as did the Second Circuit in Fleet Bank, probably does not give sufficient weight to the federal court's interest in protecting the litigant's federal rights.249
Suits Alleging That Federal Law Preempts a State Statute or
Regulation: "Construction Cases" in Which "Conduct Under Authority of the Ambiguous Provision Is Also at Issue"250
The plaintiff, a large, publicly-traded corporation, files suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State Securities Commissioner ("the Commissioner") from proceeding with a threatened lawsuit based on a novel theory of liability under the state's "Blue Sky" laws. 251 The plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner's threatened lawsuit, first mentioned after a recent nonpublic offering of securities within the state, is preempted by provisions of the federal securities laws.252 There also remain numerous ambiguities concerning the precise nature and reach of the new cause of action as a matter of state law. The plaintiff, a large office supply retailer, files suit in federal district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the State Board of Employment Discrimination from revoking its license to operate in the state.258 The Board has notified the company of its intent to strip the company of the license via administrative proceeding.259 The Board is ostensibly enforcing a state statute that prohibits employers from discriminating with respect to overtime pay.260 The plaintiff alleges that its employees do not receive overtime pay within the meaning of the state statute, properly construed.261 The plaintiff also alleges that the threatened administrative proceeding violates federal constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause and is preempted by federal labor regulations, which do not prohibit the plaintiff's labor practices.262
Unlike the Third Circuit's approach in Muir, resolution of the preemption claim is not a proper method of avoiding the federal constitutional claim or of bypassing difficult matters of state law.263 Rather, if the court determines that it is indeed "far from clear" whether the Board's application of the statute to the plaintiff is correct, abstention under Pullman is warranted to permit the state courts to resolve those Since abstention in general is basically an allocative device designed to promote the sharing of responsibility in federal litigation with state courts, it takes advantage of the expertise of state courts on state law issues. State courts may be more capable of articulating and understanding the purposes underlying a state statute or regulatory order, and they may be better able to identify and narrow the relevant issues . . . .
Id.
257 See Field, supra note 10, at 1111. The plaintiff, an operator of a chain of grocery stores, files suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Municipal Economic Redevelopment Commission ("the Commission") from enforcing a new rule prohibiting the display of alcohol-related advertisements in designated areas. 269 The Commission issued the rule pursuant to its organic statute, which gives it the authority to take any reasonable measures to promote economic growth and development in low-income urban areas.270 The plaintiff alleges that the Commission's rule is unauthorized by state law and is preempted by new federal regulations governing the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. 271 The federal court should abstain to permit a state court to define the scope of the challenged ordinance as well as to pass on the authority of the Commission under state law, if those questions have never be-fore been handled by the state judiciary and are so unclear that a federal court cannot predict how they should be decided.272 This method would accord with the First Circuit's approach in Druker v. Sullivan, in which the federal court first explored the available state law grounds of decision, including separate and independent claims regarding the Commission's authority to act under state law, and then abstained to permit a state court to rule on those claims.273 It would also mimic the approach of the Supreme Court in Pullman; there, the court abstained to permit the state court to weigh in on a pendent claim regarding the state official's authority under state law.274
Conclusion
Pullman abstention is an important tool that promotes core principles of judicial federalism without compromising the ability of the federal courts to vindicate federal constitutional and statutory rights. When a federal court's necessarily tentative resolution of unclear matters of state law constitutes needless interference with state programs and policies or creates the potential for unnecessary adjudication of a plaintiff's federal claims, Pullman allows the federal court to stay the proceedings so that such issues can be definitively resolved by a state court. If the state court's resolution is not favorable, a plaintiff may return to federal court to litigate any remaining federal claims.
For this reason, federal courts should abstain under Pullman to permit the state judiciary to resolve potentially dispositive and unclear matters of state law before considering a preemption challenge to a state measure. Preemption claims often turn on novel and difficult questions of state law that federal courts should allow state courts to decide.
The courts that have refused to invoke Pullman in preemption cases have taken too narrow a view of the doctrine as exclusively concerning constitutional avoidance. In fact, Pullman can, and should, be invoked even in the absence of a constitutional issue, so long as doing so furthers the judicial federalism-based policies of avoiding unnecessary interference with state measures, minimizing conflict between federal and state courts, and preventing unnecessary adjudication.
Thus, Pullman should be invoked in preemption cases when doing so is consistent with the judicial federalism-based policies that alone justify application of the doctrine. The doctrine should not be arbitrar-
